Eleven countries have asked Ukraine for know-how against Iranian drones: the war is also fought by 'cutting' costs

On March 2, an Iranian-made drone struck the RAF base in Akrotiri, in Cyprus. Drone wars have now crossed every border, and the Old Continent is no longer an external observer. The incident marked a psychological turning point for the European Union, prompting Greece and France to deploy frigates, F-16 fighters, and anti-drone systems to secure the eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean.

The Cypriot authorities, as a precautionary measure, ordered the closure of schools and activated mobile sirens, signaling a state of maximum alert.

In the same context, against the backdrop of the escalation in the Middle East, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy revealed a significant detail: eleven countries, including European and American nations as well as states bordering Iran, have officially requested Kiev's support to defend themselves against Shahed drones and low-altitude missiles.

Although the list has not been made public, the outlines of the agreement appear clear. Among the requesters are the United States, interested in protecting their bases in the Levant and the Gulf, and four capitals from the Persian Gulf: United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.

In Europe, in addition to Greece and Cyprus, France, Poland, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy are investing political and financial resources to integrate the Ukrainian model.

Why is the world looking to Kiev? The answer lies in the cost mathematics. A Shahed kamikaze drone is worth tens of thousands of dollars, while an interceptor of advanced systems, such as the Patriot, can cost millions. Ukraine, hardened by over two years of Russian night attacks, has developed a remarkably effective “asymmetric” response: low-cost interceptor drones, starting at around 1,000 dollars, connected to a dense network of civilian-military radars and sensors. This approach rebalances the cost-kill ratio and ensures an operational sustainability unattainable for traditional and expensive missile batteries.

There is no talk of exporting weapons: in Kiev, there is still a ban on military supplies abroad. What the world demands is "know-how": training, doctrine, and consulting to replicate defensive architectures.

Assistance is structured in three packages: joint exercises (with teams already sent to Denmark and departing for the Middle East); sharing of technologies for the "kill chain" and defensive swarm tactics; integration of these low-cost modules into complex Western systems, such as SAMP/T and NASAMS.

The "Ukrainian method" is convincing for its scalability and rapid adaptability: an ecosystem of SMEs and armed forces capable of updating software and engagement manuals in a few weeks to face the evolution of enemy tactics.

In the era of "algorithm wars", Ukraine demonstrates that security is based on rapid innovation, establishing itself as the main provider of "fresh" military experience that is readily adaptable on a global scale.