The oil boomerang: how the war with Iran has filled Moscow's coffers in two weeks

One night in March, in the darkness interrupted by position lights, a supertanker turns off the Strait of Hormuz. Radars signal new threats, convoys are suspended, insurance premiums soar. Thousands of kilometers away, on the stock exchange terminals, Brent prices spike above $100 per barrel, stocks slide, and governments scramble to release strategic reserves. And in this global uproar, far from the Middle Eastern front, Russia cashes in: about 6 billion euros in just two weeks, according to a new analysis that sheds light on the energy side of the war that began on February 28, 2026.

What the data says: the (partial) bill of two weeks

According to calculations from the think tank Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), Moscow would have raked in about 6 billion euros from fossil fuel exports in the two weeks following the start of the war between the United States and Israel against Iran. Within this surge, the month of March shows an “extra” of about 672 million euros compared to the previous trend, the result of a combined increase in average daily prices of 14% compared to February. The predominant share of the increase – about 625 million euros – comes from oil trade, which is the fiscal engine of the entire Russian energy system. This was exclusively reported by the British newspaper The Guardian, citing the dataset and estimates from CREA. These numbers are not an official accounting figure, but a methodical extrapolation on prices, volumes, routes, and sanctions: an imperfect tool, but today essential for understanding where money flows in energy. (Sources: The Guardian; CREA)

Why the war drives up Russian revenues

The spike is not random. From the night of February 28 to 29, 2026, with the first joint raids by the USA and Israel on Iranian targets, the oil market has "priced in" the risk of a lasting squeeze on the planet's main bottleneck: the Strait of Hormuz, a transit valve for about 20% of the world's oil and a significant share of LNG. Within a few days, Brent returned to triple digits, reaching and surpassing $100; operators began to hedge against the possibility of prolonged production and shipping disruptions in the Gulf; and insurance premiums for passage through the strait rose. The International Energy Agency (IEA) responded by coordinating the largest release of emergency stocks in its history: 400 million barrels from the stocks of 32 member countries, an operation more than double that of 2022 (when the releases followed Russia's invasion of Ukraine). Despite the intervention, prices remained tense: a sign that the market fears a prolonged "disruption." (Sources: AP News; IEA; Euronews)

For Moscow, all this translates into higher prices for global energy, a diverted demand from the Gulf routes to alternative ones, and thus into stronger revenues from oil and derivatives. It is a well-known paradox of energy crises: when Middle Eastern supply falters, extra-Gulf exporters – if equipped with production capacity, insurable fleets, and willing customers – can earn more even without drastically increasing volumes.

The mechanism: from Brent to the Russian budget

Sanctions and discounts. Since 2022, with the price caps from the G7 and European restrictions, Russia has sold its benchmark crude Urals at a significant discount to Brent. This discount eroded Moscow's tax revenue for months despite sustained volumes. However, the conflict with Iran has temporarily reshaped the balances: with Brent above $100, the Urals discount has narrowed at some Asian ports, and in specific cases, there have even been instances of local "premiums" due to freight and insurance costs. Meanwhile, independent analyses indicate that the price of Urals has surpassed key thresholds for the Russian budget, centered on an average assumption of about $59 per barrel: every additional dollar above that level translates into extra taxes and export duties for the Kremlin. (Sources: The Moscow Times; Hydrocarbon Processing).

Fleet and “shadow fleet”. The Russian logistics chain increasingly relies on a shadow fleet of uninsured tankers in the West, on corporate triangulations, and on cargoes that change flags and ownership along the route. As of February 2026, CREA still reports dozens of ships operating under “dubious” or false flags, and a significant volume – about 6.9 million tons – of Russian crude “adrift” at sea without a declared buyer at the end of the month. With the shock on Hormuz, some of these barrels may find an outlet more easily, especially if some large buyers obtain regulatory margins or temporary waivers from Western partners. (Source: CREA)

Key customers: China, India, Turkey, and the EU. Since 2022, China has become the main buyer of Russian crude via sea and pipeline, while India has “reshaped” its imports in favor of discounted Urals. However, as of February 2026, India was reported to be decreasing its Russian volumes, partly due to the tightening sanctions on some big players in the Russian oil sector. Now, with Gulf flows reduced and a month of conditional clearance from Washington to New Delhi to purchase Russian barrels, there is room for a rebound: and this is where the price effect (more than the volume effect) is making a difference, boosting Moscow's revenue in the very short term. (Sources: AP News; CREA)

How important is the “IEA factor”: the cap on market losses

The IEA approved on March 11, 2026 the coordinated release of 400 million barrels of crude from emergency stocks, the largest operation ever carried out by the agency since 1974. The goal is twofold: to signal to the market that there is a credible safety net and, in practice, to inject replacement barrels while the Gulf route remains at high risk. But the math is ruthless: even assuming rapid and uniform releases, the stocks cover only a fraction of the possible daily shortfalls if the Strait of Hormuz remains “constrained” for a long time. It is therefore not surprising that Brent has remained volatile above $100 despite the announcement, and that national authorities – from the United States to Japan – have implemented their own release plans. (Sources: IEA; AP News; Euronews; Axios)

Europe: between vulnerability and antibodies

For the European Union, the phase is one of stress but not panic. Direct imports of Russian crude oil have collapsed compared to 2021–2022, but EU countries remain exposed to LNG and pipeline gas from Russia and, in general, to global energy price fluctuations. The analysis by CREA highlights how a significant share of Russian LNG is still directed to Europe, and how – in the Hormuz crisis – spot flows to Asia could trigger bidding wars among buyers. The maneuvering margins for Brussels lie on the demand side: efficiency, savings, acceleration of renewables. By 2025, additional solar generation has already avoided significant gas consumption for electricity production; replicating and increasing that pace in 2026 is the fastest way to cushion shocks. (Source: CREA)