the war
The Strait of Hormuz remains too dangerous: why Trump is sending another 2,500 Marines
The almost deserted stretch of sea: elite forces to create a security buffer, clear critical routes, and curb the escalation that has driven up oil prices.
The lanes of the Strait of Hormuz have nearly emptied, with tanker traffic reduced to zero during certain time slots, marking an unprecedented operational standstill.
In response, Washington has redeployed approximately 2,500 Marines from the Indo-Pacific theater to the Middle East, a move aimed at reshaping the military and commercial balances in the region. The new deployment, configured as a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and likely embarked on large amphibious assault ships like the USS Tripoli, brings versatile landing capabilities, helicopters, and F-35B short takeoff fighters into play.
These forces will join the 40,000-50,000 U.S. military personnel already present at various bases and outposts within the CENTCOM area of responsibility.
The situation deteriorated in late February 2026, following a series of drone and missile attacks attributed to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRGC). The economic impact was immediate and severe: deviations to alternative routes surged between 300% and 360%, affecting supply chains in a bottleneck through which between one-fifth and one-third of the world's crude oil passes.
Tehran is conducting an asymmetric war, capitalizing on the perceived risk by shipowners and on insurance premiums skyrocketing. In this context, the arrival of the MEU serves as an essential tool for deterrence and de-escalation. The Marines will act as a tactical “buffer”: they will be able to protect port perimeters, create temporary safety bubbles for convoys, and support delicate mine-clearing operations.
The threat at sea is real: last week, the United States destroyed 16 Iranian mine-laying units in a counter-interdiction campaign. The possibility of directly escorting commercial tankers, considered by the White House, carries high escalation risks and imposes strict rules of engagement to avoid ambushes.
At the same time, naval commands must contend with insidious electronic interference, such as GPS and AIS signal jamming. Regional governments are attempting to redirect exports to pipelines to the Red Sea or to ports “outside the Strait,” like Fujairah, but the logistical capacity of these alternatives remains limited compared to the volumes that pass through Hormuz.
Currently, international coalitions manage maritime traffic “in waves”, opening and closing tactical corridors based on the evolution of the threat. The crucial challenge in the coming weeks will be to understand whether the new U.S. amphibious force will be able to stably reopen the routes before a global logistical and civil collapse materializes.