What does the Washington plan entail (and how much could it cost) to reopen the Strait of Hormuz?

The freight rate chart is an upward diagonal, the Brent price has surpassed $100, and low-altitude drones and anti-ship missiles can arrive from Iranian shores — in just a few minutes. It is in this scenario that the White House has brought back to the table an idea that seemed relegated to the annals of naval history: to escort oil tankers with warships under a coalition flag.

What Washington announced

In the last ten days, President Donald Trump and his closest aides have publicly outlined the perimeter of a possible intervention. On March 3, 2026, the president declared that the U.S. Navy "will begin escorting oil tankers through the Strait of Hormuz as soon as possible, if necessary." A few days later, on March 13, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent explained that the escorts could begin "soon", "perhaps with an international coalition", as soon as air control is reestablished and the Iranian missile-launching capability is degraded. In the same hours, the White House confirmed that the Navy and Department of Energy are "drawing up options" to reopen transits. The Associated Press also reported that the president has asked "about seven countries" to participate with naval units, so far without formal commitments.

Why the Strait of Hormuz is crucial

The Strait is the "valve" of the Persian Gulf: every day, on average, around 20 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum products transit through it, equivalent to about one-fifth of global consumption and over one-quarter of global maritime oil trade. The share destined for Asia is predominant — particularly China, India, South Korea, and Japan — but any prolonged disruption affects the entire global economy. To date, the bypass routes via pipelines in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates only compensate for a fraction of the volumes that normally pass through Hormuz.

The "escort plan": what’s on the table

According to press reports and confirmations from the administration, the options under consideration include three operational pillars: more air power to neutralize in real-time Iranian drones, missiles, and coastal batteries that threaten the convoys; actual naval escorts, with destroyers and frigates accompanying tankers along the two traffic lanes of the Strait; in a high-intensity scenario, even the deployment of ground troops to "control" segments of the coastal strip from which the most dangerous attacks could be launched.

The return of the convoys evokes the years 1987-1988 of the American operation "Earnest Will", when merchant ships were escorted under the U.S. flag by more escort ships and with ad hoc air cover: historical experience suggests the need for robust formations, with 3-4 military units for each group of civilian ships, dedicated helicopters, and mine countermeasure capabilities. But compared to the 1980s, the threat is more complex: then, mines dominated; today, the Iranian package combines mines, fast boats, cruise missiles, and long-range drones.

How many ships would be needed (and for how long) Estimates vary, but converge on one point: the commitment would be significant. Analysts cited by the U.S. press calculate that, to escort convoys of 5-10 tankers, "a dozen" military ships would be needed, with air defense and electronic warfare capable of handling saturation attacks. In addition to these, unmanned assets would be required: at least a dozen MQ-9 Reaper drones on continuous patrol, with sensors and engagement capabilities against launchers overlooking the coast. Such a setup would require "thousands of military personnel and sailors", with a "substantial" financial commitment lasting for months. Meanwhile, actual traffic could remain reduced to a minimum share — even to 10% of normal, according to Lloyd’s List Intelligence — due to security constraints, grouping expectations, and reduced speed in transit.

The mine issue: the less spectacular and more insidious threat

The mining threat in the Strait of Hormuz does not need large numbers to become effective. The dynamics of the current and the narrowness of the channel mean that a few well-placed devices — or worse, drifting mines — are enough to paralyze passages. Independent analyses highlight that U.S. capability for mine countermeasures is not at a historical high; in Europe, the Royal Navy has reduced the number of dedicated minehunters, while some Gulf countries have modern but numerically limited assets. And while mines are being searched for and cleared, the timelines stretch: freight rates remain high, insurance costs soar, and stocks dwindle.

What the latest coalition precedent in the Gulf teaches

In 2019, following a series of attacks on tankers and the seizure of the Stena Impero, the International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC) was established in Bahrain with the Sentinel task force: United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates — later joined by other countries — coordinated patrols and traffic assistance, up to occasional escorts. That experience, while less intense than the plan currently discussed, offers two useful lessons: the cooperation with the maritime industry (alerts, data sharing, recommended corridors) and the importance of having integrated headquarters with liaison officers from multiple countries, capable of communicating with UKMTO and commercial monitoring centers. In other words: naval security works if it becomes an “ecosystem” among governments, military navies, and shipowners.

Drones and contested skies: why MQ-9s are needed (but not enough)

The MQ-9 Reaper, already used in maritime surveillance in the Gulf of Oman and the Strait of Hormuz, offers a valuable mix of endurance, sensors, and — if authorized — precision engagement capabilities against emerging threats. During the peak tensions of 2019, an MQ-9 monitored the damage to the “Kokuka Courageous”; in the same year, a U.S. RQ-4 Global Hawk was shot down by an Iranian SAM over the maritime sector, demonstrating the aerial risk. Deploying “at least a dozen” MQ-9s to blanket cover convoys, as some analysts suggest, means organizing 24/7 flight schedules, secure forward bases, and deconflicted air corridors with allied forces: feasible, but not without logistical effort and costs.

Timing and constraints: why it’s not a switch

Even in the best-case scenario — a broad coalition, the rapid suppression of Iranian launch platforms along the coast, and an acceptable risk profile for insurers — it will take weeks to put to sea and make a credible backup device "operational." Independent assessments speak of a window that could extend "until the end of March or early April" for a fully functioning system, and it is not guaranteed that, once initiated, traffic will immediately return to pre-crisis volumes: business caution and the "shadow fleet" will continue to affect transits. Meanwhile, energy prices remain volatile and Asian demand is still seeking alternatives.

And if that’s not enough? The “boots on the beach” hypothesis
In the toughest toolbox, one that no policymaker likes to open, there is the idea of using amphibious forces and ground troops to remove the threat from the coastal areas from which missiles, drones are launched or from which fast boats depart. It is an option that some media outlets have reported as "on the table," and which Adnkronos describes by detailing a plausible sequence: intensive airstrikes along the coast, followed by Marine raids, with possible repetitions in waves. However, the same analysis warns: without a prolonged presence, the counterpart can play "cat and mouse," dispersing the launchers and reappearing after each clearance. And a prolonged presence, in that context, means invasion: thousands of soldiers exposed to Iranian forces and indirect fire from militias; a prospect that multiplies risks, time horizons, and political costs. Experts in mine warfare and A2/AD also remind us that, in the geography of Hormuz, even temporary control of stretches of coastline does not eliminate the residual risk of mines and stand-off attacks.

The European variable and Gulf allies
In 2019, alongside the U.S.-led IMSC, several European countries launched the EMASoH mission for "maritime awareness" in the Strait. Today, with a more complex threat, a European role is being considered that combines air cover, escort ships, minesweepers, and electronic warfare capabilities, in coordination with the Gulf navies. The ideal architecture is a shared command, harmonized rules of engagement, and a continuous interface with the world of shipowners and insurers. However, the concrete availability — number of units, deployment times, ROE — remains the true political unknown, as London and Paris well know, after years of reducing specialist mine countermeasure fleets.

The economic and strategic bill
Every escorted convoy requires not only "visible" ships but also a support chain: military tankers for at-sea refueling, SAR teams, floating workshops, resilient C2 systems, high-frequency ISR patrols. Industry studies and reports warn that sustaining a mission of this kind for a long time entails opportunity costs: diverting AEGIS destroyers or patrol aircraft from theaters like the Indo-Pacific or Europe means accepting vulnerabilities elsewhere. At the same time, pressure on insurance premiums, freight rates, and risk coverage drives up the final price of every barrel that manages to pass, with measurable impacts on global growth.